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M. van Dijk and A.J.E. Jansman
SOM theme E: Financial markets and institutions
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This study examines the impact of the extend to which auditors will be able to justify errors
in case of litigation, the strategy of the audit firm, the authority of the client’s management
to choose the audit firm and the extend to which auditors are successful in their careers on
auditors’ willingness to allow errors in financial statements under mangement pressure. The
results show that all factors, with the exception of audit firms strategy, significantly
influence auditors’ ability to resist management pressure.
17KHLPSDFWRIFRQWH[WXDOIDFWRUVRQDXGLWRUV¶DELOLW\WRUHVLVWPDQDJHPHQW
SUHVVXUH
M. van Dijk and A.J.E. Jansman
1. Introduction
Financial statements contain information about the financial position and
results of companies and this information is used by users of these statements
for a large number of decisions. Loan officers in banks, for instance base their
loan decisions usually on information in financial statements and financial
analysts and shareholders use this information to determine whether it is
advisable to invest in the companies concerned.
However, financial statements are also used by shareholders and supervisory
directors to evaluate managers of companies and managers’ compensation
often depends on information in financial statements. Therefore, users of
statements cannot be sure that financial statements prepared by the managers of
a company provide a true and fair view of the company’s financial situation
and hence users demand that financial statements be audited by an independent
financial expert (a public auditor). It is essential of course that these auditors
are indeed independent and that their audits are not influenced by the client’s
management.
In recent years however, concern about auditors’ independence has been
expressed by regulatory authorities (SEC Report 1994) and the accounting
profession itself (POB Reports 1993/1994). They have emphasized the fact that
managers control the current and future audit fees that the audit firm hopes to
obtain from the audit, and therefore are in a powerful position in audit conflict
situations. Empirical studies do indicate that managers exert pressure on
auditors in audit conflict situations to allow errors in financial statements by
(subtly or overtly) threatening to break off the relationship with the audit firm,
and that auditors regularly yield to this pressure (Van de Poel and Schilder,
1990 and Wieleman et al., 1990).
2In this study we investigate whether auditors’ willingness to allow errors in
financial statements under pressure from the management of audited
companies, is influenced by the nature of the error, the audit firm’s strategy,
the management’s authority to choose the audit firm and the auditors’ success
in their careers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 some prior
research is reviewed and hypotheses are formulated with respect to the effects
of the above-mentioned factors on auditors’ independence. Section 3 describes
the experiment that has been conducted to test the hypotheses and section 4
describes the results. The results are discussed in section 5.
2. Prior  research and hypotheses
Introduction. In recent years several authors have studied auditors’
independence and factors that affect this independence. Most of these studies
however concern the perceptions of users of financial statements. Although
these studies are relevant because users’ trust in financial statements is
determined by their perceptions of  auditors’ independence, this research gives
only limited insight into auditors’ actual behavior in audit conflict situations.
Research into auditors’ behaviour in audit conflict situations is sparse,
however. Lord (1992) has investigated the impact of client characteristics and
competition on auditors’ independence, and Hackenbrack and Nelson (1996)
have investigated the impact of engagement risk on auditors’ willingness to
permit aggressive reporting methods under management pressure.
Nature of the error. Errors in financial statements are risky for auditors because
these errors may be discovered by users and may lead to lawsuits and claims
against the auditor who wrongly approved the statements. In recent years the
number of lawsuits and claims against auditors has increased sharply, and for
3that reason auditors are much more mindful of the legal consequences of errors
when auditing financial statements.
Jurisprudence suggests that the bare fact that a statement contains errors is not
enough reason to convict auditors and to sustain claims, but that also has to be
proved that the audit was not carried out with “reasonable care and skill”
(Gwilliam, 1987). Herewith a mayor point is whether the audit was carried out
in conformity with generally accepted auditing standards.
Sometimes errors in financial statements clearly show that the auditor did not
carry out the audit with “reasonable care and skill”, i.e. in accordance with
generally accepted auditing standards. This is the case, for instance, if losses
are applied against the equity of the company (whereas auditing standards
require that such losses should be booked against the results), or if  the
statements contain real estate that is not owned by the company (whereas
auditing standards require that in case of real estate a cadastral search into the
ownership should to be carried out). In a lawsuit the auditor will not be able to
justify such errors and therefore such errors will lead to conviction of the
auditor and to allowance of claims. Therefore, it can be expected that auditors
will not be willing to accept these types of errors under management pressure.
Sometimes however, auditors are pressured to accept errors in financial
statements of which it is much more difficult to demonstrate that the auditor
acted culpably. This is the case, for instance, if provisions in the balance sheet
are set at a wrong level on the basis of subjective estimates or if real estate is
valued at a wrong level on the basis of  a (wrong) report by a broker. Even if it
becomes clear later on that the statement contained errors, it is usually
impossible to prove that the auditor did not carry out the audit with “reasonable
care and skill”, and such errors usually do not lead to conviction of the auditor
and to allowance of claims in court. Therefore, it can be expected that auditors
will more willing to accept these types of errors, because they can justify such
errors better in case of litigation.
4These observations lead to the following hypothesis:
+ 7KHUH LV D SRVLWLYH UHODWLRQVKLS
EHWZHHQ DXGLWRUV¶ ZLOOLQJQHVV WR
DOORZ HUURUV LQ ILQDQFLDO VWDWHPHQWV
XQGHUPDQDJHPHQWSUHVVXUHDQGWKH
H[WHQG WRZKLFK WKH\ZLOO EH DEOH WR
MXVWLI\ WKHVH HUURUV LQ FDVH RI
OLWLJDWLRQ
Strategy of the audit firm. In recent years competition in the audit market has
increased sharply.  As a result, audit firms feel an increased need to stand out
from others and many audit firms do this by specializing in certain industries or
types of clients (Langendijk, 1994). Sometimes such a strategy is also the result
of specific expertise within the audit firm and the need to use this expertise
optimally.
Audit firms communicate their strategies concerning the desired composition
of their clients to their employees and they are expected to put in extra effort to
bring in the desired clients and to prevent such clients from leaving the audit
firm. If the last unhoped should happen, then the management of the audit firm
will critically investigate whether the loss of the client was inevitable and if
they reach the conclusion that the auditor who was responsible has made an
inadequate effort to prevent the loss of the client, this will have a negative
impact on his evaluation. So, if the strategy of the audit firm is directed at
specialization in certain types of clients, the auditors of the audit firm will put
in extra effort to prevent such clients from leaving. Therefore, it may be
expeced that if such clients pressure auditors (with the subtle or overt threat to
break off the relationship with the audit firm), auditors will yield to such
pressure sooner.
5The above leads to the following hypothesis:
+ ,I WKH VWUDWHJ\ RI WKH DXGLW ILUP LV
GLUHFWHG DW VSHFLDOL]DWLRQ LQ FHUWDLQ
W\SHV RI FOLHQWV DXGLWRUV ZLOO \LHOG
VRRQHU LI WKH PDQDJHPHQW RI VXFK
FOLHQWVH[HUWSUHVVXUHWRDOORZHUURUV
LQILQDQFLDOVWDWHPHQWV
Management’s authority to choose the audit firm. Research shows that the use
of threats in negotiations  is effective only if the threats are credible, i.e. if  the
person who is uttering the threats is able to carry them out (Pruitt and
Carnevale, 1993). To auditors who are put under pressure by the auditiees
management with the threat to leave the audit firm, this means that this threat
will only be effective if the auditee’s management do have the authority to
choose another audit firm if the auditor does not give in.
Managers’ authority to choose audit firms varies greatly in practice however. If
the auditee is an autonomous company of which all shares are owned by the
manager, then this manager has full power to choose the audit firm. If the
auditee is part of a concern, however, the audit firm is usually chosen by the
management of the concern and the management of the auditee do not have
much influence. In situations where an audit committee exists, the influence
management has on the choice of the audit firm usually is limited also. As a
consequence, it may be expected that auditors will be more susceptible to
management pressure if the management of the auditee has more influence on
the choice of the audit firm.
6This leads to the following hypothesis:
+ 7KHUH LV D SRVLWLYH UHODWLRQVKLS
EHWZHHQ DXGLWRUV¶ ZLOOLQJQHVV WR
DOORZ HUURUV LQ ILQDQFLDO VWDWHPHQWV
XQGHU SUHVVXUH IURP WKH DXGLWHH¶V
PDQDJHPHQW DQG PDQDJHPHQW¶V
DXWKRULW\WRFKRRVHWKHDXGLWILUP
Success auditors. Auditors in audit firms have to pass through a great number
of ranks before they, with a successfull career, are accepted as  partner in the
audit firm. Auditors are evaluated on a large number of criteria to determine
whether they should be promoted to a higher rank. At the beginning of their
career they are evaluated mainly on technical skills, but later on social and
commercial skills (the ability to bring in new clients and the ability to maintain
good relations with clients, thus  preventing them from leaving the audit firm)
will become increasingly important.
As we have seen, auditors regularly are put under pressure by the clients’s
management with the threat to break off the relationship with the audit firm. If
auditors do not give in to the client’s wishes, the relationship with the client’s
management will become strained. Furthermore, there is a risk that the client’s
management carries out its threat and breaks off the relationship with the audit
firm, and therefore auditors who are not susceptible to management pressure
run a greater risk of loosing clients. Because the loss of clients has a negative
impact on the way auditors are evaluated, it can be expected that auditors who
are not susceptible to management pressure will be less succesful in their
careers than auditors who are susceptible to management pressure.
7This leads to the following hypothesis:
+ 7KHUH LV D SRVLWLYH UHODWLRQVKLS
EHWZHHQ DXGLWRUV¶ ZLOOLQJQHVV WR





Research method. Experiments have been chosen as a method of testing the
hypotheses. In experiments independent variables are manipulated under
controlled circumstances to determine their impact on dependent variables and
for that reason experiments are the best method of testing hypotheses about
causal relationships between variables.
The artificial conditions of experiments (e.g. the use of students and
oversimplified tasks) are sometimes mentioned as a reason why experimental
results are difficult to generalize to real world settings. For this reason real
auditors have been chosen as subjects in this study and they have been asked to
perform common tasks from audit practice (e.g. making decisions on financial
statements in audit conflict situations). Therefore, the results of this study are
expected to hold in the real world too.
Sample. Data have been gathered from Dutch certified public auditors, because
these are qualified to issue an opinion about financial statements and will
negotiate with the auditee’s management in audit conflict situations.
Respondents were selected as follows. From a list of all Dutch certified
auditors two groups of practising auditors were selected, namely (1) successful
auditors (auditors who became partner in a Big 5 audit firm within 10 years
after becoming a certified auditor), and (2) less successful auditors (auditors
who became a certified auditor 20 or more years ago and who have not yet
8been accepted as a partner in a audit firm at this moment). From both groups 50
auditors were selected at random and were asked by telephone to participate in
the study. A questionnaire was sent to the 94 auditors who were willing to
participate and 61 questionnaire were returned. After two reminders another 21
auditors returned the questionnaire. So, of the 100 auditors that were
approached a total of 82 returned the questionnaire, giving a response rate of
82.0%. Of the respondents, 39 (78%) were “successful auditors”, and 43 (86%)
were “less successful auditors”. Respondents’ mean age was 51.8 years (SD 4.8
years) and on average they had been certified auditors for 22.0 years (SD 4.8
years).
Instrument. Data were collected with the help of a questionnaire. This
questionnaire describes the case of a medium-sized bank where the
management and the auditor disagree about the bank’s financial statements.
The auditor is of the opinion that these statements contain a material error and
he insists that this error should be corrected, but the management of the bank
disagrees and exerts pressure on the auditor to approve the statements. The
conflict has escalated so much that the management of the bank considers to
break off the relationship with the audit firm. With the help of the three
variables mentioned in hypotheses 1, 2 and 3, eight scenarios are described.
Respondents are asked to assume they are the auditor in the case and they are
asked to indicate for each scenario (on a 7-point Likert scale) how likely it is
that they will yield to the pressure from the bank’s management and will accept
the financial statements. Demand and learning effects are minimised by
presenting the scenarios in random order and by formulating the case in the
most neutral language possible. The case is described in appendix A, which
also contains an example of the scenarios.
Experimental design. This study examines the effects of three experimental
factors (nature of error, strategy of the audit firm and auditee’s management
authority in audit firms selection), and one group factor (success auditor) on
auditors’ willingness to accept errors in financial statements under management
9pressure. The experimental task consisted in repeated judgements on all eight
possible combinations of the experimental factors and the experimental design
can be defined as a repeated measures block design with three experimental
factors and one grouping factor. The factors and their levels are described in
table 1.
Levels
Factors Level 1 Level 2
EXPERIMENTAL FACTORS
• nature error














Table 1  Factor levels
Data analysis. Data were analyzed with the help of ANOVA, because of
ANOVA’s unique abilities to examine the effects of categorial variables and
interaction effects. The significance of both the main effects and the interaction
effects was examined at the 0.05 level. To obtain additional information on the
relevance of the effects, the explained proportion of the variance (ω2) was
computed for all significant effects.
4. Results
The results of ANOVA are summarized in table 2. It shows the main effects of
the three experimental factors and the grouping factor, and the interaction
effects. All main effects are significant at the 0.05 level, with the exception of
10
audit firm’s strategy, so hypothesis 2 has to be rejected. The interaction effects
are not significant either. Table 3 presents the ω2 and relative ω2 of all
significant effects. It shows that by far the greater part of the variance (55.0%)
is explained by the nature of the error.
SS df MS F p
Main effects
nature error (N)




























































Table 2  ANOVA













Table 3  Variance explained by significant effects
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The marginal means of the dependent variable are presented in table 4 (a high
value indicates a high willingness of the auditor to yield to management
pressure). Table 4 shows a higher willingness to yield if auditors think that they
will be able to justify the errors in case of litigation, and if the auditee’s
management has a great influence on the selection of the audit firm, which
confirms hypotheses 1 and 3. Hypothesis 4 predicts that there is a positive
relationship between auditors’ willingnes to allow errors in financial statements
under management pressure, and the success auditors have in their careers.
Table 4 however shows that this relationship is negative, so hypothesis 4 has to
be rejected.













Table 4  Marginal means for factor levels
5. Conclusions and discussion
As was expected this study shows that the auditors’ willingness to accept
errors in financial statements under management pressure is high if auditors
think that they will be able to justify these errors in case of litigation, and if the
auditee’s management has a great influence on the selection of the audit firm.
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The success auditors have in their careers was a relevant factor too, but
contrary then was expected more successful auditors were found to be less
willing to yield to management pressure. There are several possible
explanations for this result. One explanation is that successful auditors usually
are partners in audit firms and loss of a client will therefore have a less
negative impact on their careers (because they are already partner). Another
explanation is that successful auditors have more social skills and power of
persuasion, and therefore are better able to convince clients of their point of
view in case of conflicts, which will prevent them from leaving the audit firm.
Further research will have to bring more clarity.
13
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The financial statements of a medium-sized bank are audited by a certified public
auditor. During the past year the management of the bank and the auditor differed
in opinion about the financial statements of the bank. According to the auditor,
these statements contain a material error and he insists that this error should be
corrected, but the management of the bank disagrees. The conflict has escalated so
much that the management has declared that they are considering breaking off the
relationship with the audit firm.
Some authors have suggested that the willingness of auditors to yield to
management pressure is influenced by the following factors:
1) Nature of  the error.
In the scenarios the extent in which the error can be justified to third parties is
described as “justifiable” or “unjustifiable”. When the error is described as
“justifiable” the auditor is of the opinion that the error is a material accounting
error which should be corrected, but that he will be able to justify this error to
third parties. This is the case, for instance, if provisions in the balance sheet are
set at a wrong level on the basis of on subjective estimates. When the error is
described as “unjustifiable”, the auditor not only is of the opinion that het error
is a material accounting error, but also that he will not be able to justify this
error to third parties. This is the case, for instance, if the statements contain real
estate from which cadastral search has indicated that the bank is not the owner.
2) Strategy of the audit firm.
In the scenarios the strategy of the audit firm is described as “emphasis on
financial institutions” or as “no emphasis on financial institutions”. When the
strategy is described as “emphasis on financial institutions” the audit firm has
relatively few financial companies (banks or assurance companies) as a client
and the audit firm actively strives to increase that sort of clients. When the
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strategy is described as “no emphasis on financial institutions” the audit firm
does not strives to increase specificly the number of financial companies as
client.
3) Authority auditee’s management in audit firm’s selection.
In the scenarios the authority of the auditees management to chose the audit
firm is described as “large” or “small”. When management’s authority is
described as “large” the management of the bank has a decisive influence on
the selection of the audit firm. When management authority is described as
“small”, management’s influence on the selection of the audit firm is small,
which for instance is the case when the bank is part of a concern and the audit
firm is chosen by the management of the concern.
Eight scenarios are described below with the help of the a forementioned factors.
Supposing that you were the auditor of the bank, you are requested to estimate the
probability that you will accept the financial statements of the bank as it was
prepared by the bank’s management. Please indicate this probability on a 7-point
scale by circling one of the figures from 1 to 7. Figure 1 indicates that you consider
the probability that you will accept the statements to be very low and figure 7
indicates that you consider this probability to be very high.
Scenario 1
- nature of the error : justifiable
- strategy of the audit firm : emphasis on financial institutions
- authority auditees management in
in audit firms selection : large
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Your estimate of the probability that you will accept the financial statements of the
bank (circle one of the numbers from 1 to 7):
1                   2                   3                   4                   5                   6                   7
very low very high
probability probability
of accepting of accepting
